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Abstract
Leniency programs entail that the competition agency waives some fraction
of the fines for a former cartel member, provided that it comes forward with
information. I use a game theoretical collusion model from Harrington (2008),
where the competition authority has an endogenous policy choice. The model
is utilized to analyze how the degree of leniency impacts the firms’ collusion
decision. The result implies that it is in fact optimal to offer full amnesty to the first
firm to come forward. Furthermore, when firms have private information about
the probability of prosecution, the probability of whistle-blowing and conviction
increases. This is provided that leniency is sufficiently generous.
Keywords: Collusion, Corporate Leniency Programs, Whistle-blowing, Industrial
Organization, Game theory, Private information
© Tyra Merker
2015
Corporate Leniency and Incentives for Collusion
Tyra Merker
http://www.duo.uio.no/
Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo
i
ii
Preface
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Tore Nilssen for his support,
valuable feedback and encouragement. I am truly grateful for his thorough efforts,
which have raised the quality of my work.
I would also like to thank ESOP and the Department of Economics for providing
me with a scholarship and office space for this past year. It has made the work with
my thesis much more comfortable.
Finally, I would like to give a warm thank you to my friends and family. You have
calmed me down during stressful exam periods - or at least attempted to do so - and
always offered words of encouragement. Tom, thank you for our study groups and for
giving feedback on a full draft of my thesis. Fernanda, thank you for putting things
into perspective when I need it the most. And last, but certainly not least; to Yoseph,
thank you for standing by me always, especially when I am at my worst.
iii
iv
Summary
This thesis analyzes the effect of corporate leniency programs on incentives for
collusion. Participating in illegal collusion can result in large fines, possibly even
imprisonment. Leniency programs entail that the competition agency waives some
fraction of these fines for a cartel member, provided that it comes forward with
information. Full amnesty from fines creates an incentive for cartel members to
cooperate with anti-trust agencies, thus causing cartels to break down. On the other
hand, it lowers the expected penalties the colluding firms must pay, which in turn can
lead to more cartels being formed. The overall effect of leniency programs on collusion
is therefore not immediately clear.
By utilizing a game theoretical model from Harrington (2008), I am able to assess
how the incentives for collusion are affected by a leniency program. More specifically, I
analyze how the degree of leniency, measured by the fraction of fines waived, impacts
the firms’ collusion decision. The model implies that it is in fact optimal to offer full
amnesty, however leniency should only be awarded to the first firm to come forward.
Allowing more firms to receive some degree of leniency can be justified if the first firm
is unable to provide enough evidence to ensure a conviction.
I then turn to a model (Harrington and Chang, 2014) which incorporates more
of the competition authorities actions, such as the size of penalties, prosecution and
investigation efforts. The model shows how the cases created by the leniency program
can crowd out resources spent on investigating active cartels. Thereby, the existence of
a leniency program can actually raise the overall cartel rate. In order to prevent this,
sufficiently large fines are needed.
Finally, I analyze the choice of whistle-blowing and the impact of information. The
motivation is that leniency models generally feature symmetric firms, leading to the
unrealistic result that either all or none of the firms apply for leniency. Using a model
where firms have private information about the strength of the case (of the competition
authority) against them, can lead to more realistic equilibrium outcomes. The model
allows me to assess the firms’ decisions under uncertainty, and demonstrates how the
lack of information creates an incentive to pre-empt an opponent’s application. As a
result, the probability of whistle-blowing and conviction increases when firms have
private information. This result holds provided that leniency is sufficiently large.
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1 Introduction
There is a consensus that collusion is costly. When firms secretly agree to set high
prices in order to earn higher profits, consumers must literally pay the price. It
restricts supply and, in the long run, competitiveness and employment opportunities
(European Competition Network, 2012). Firms may also collude in public tenders (e.g.
through bid-rigging), thus making a large profit. In Norway, the so-called asphalt-
cartel was able to charge the government several million NOK (Norwegian Kroner) in
excess on single tenders, by dividing the market between each other and fixing prices
(NRK, 2011). The cartel was unveiled when a cartel member alerted the competition
authorities (CA), and the other cartel member was subsequently fined 140 million NOK
(which later was reduced to 40 million NOK in a court of law) (Konkurransetilsynet,
2014).
As collusion is illegal in most countries, this illusive activity is hard to detect.
Meetings between cartel members are held in secret, written agreements are rarely
made and some cartels go to extraordinary lengths to keep their activities hidden.
A creative example is the moon-phase cartel, which endured for several decades.
According to their secret agreement, all firms entered high bids when selling electrical
equipment to the US government in the 1960s. One predetermined winner would enter
a slightly lower bid, thereby still making a large profit. The winner was determined
by the phase of the moon at the day the auction was announced. Through this
arrangement, the cartel was able to operate undetected for decades, as no meetings
were necessary between its members. It is estimated that the cost to consumers was
approximately 175 million US Dollars each year of the cartel’s existence (Foundation for
Economic Education, 1997).
Cartels are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and small countries like Norway
face additional challenges when fighting them. Leading agents in an industry meet
regularly through industry associations and other fora, as well as having studied at the
same universities and colleges. Not only does it make collusion easier to commence,
but personal relationships and loyalty can prevent collusion from breaking down
(Meyer, 2011). Director of Konkurransetilsynet (the Norwegian CA), Christine Meyer
(2011) points out that stable leader-groups in stable networks and associations have
been the backbone of the largest and most damaging cartels in Norway.
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1.1 Leniency Programs
A cartel conviction implies large fines for the firms and individuals involved, possibly
even imprisonment. In order to facilitate the breakdown of cartels, the US Department
of Justice offered their first leniency program in 1978. The Corporate Leniency Program
was substantially revised in 1993, and the Leniency Policy for Individuals was in place
in 1994. The first firm (and the first firm only) to come forward now automatically
receives full amnesty from fines, and its individuals avoid personal fines, criminal
convictions and prison terms. However, there is no amnesty from private lawsuits,
for example put forth by victims seeking restitution (US Department of Justice, 2008).
After the 1993 revision, a large number of leniency applications were submitted and the
program was deemed a large success (Harrington and Chang, 2014). The Department
of Justice has collected approximately 5 billion US Dollars in fines from cartel cases,
where over 90 % of this figure is a result of leniency cases (Stolt-Nielsen, 2011).
In a shipping-cartel, a Norwegian company (Stolt-Nielsen) was granted leniency
and its competitor and co-conspirator (Odfjell) was fined 42.5 million US Dollars
by the US Department of Justice. Due to the US authorities’ insistence that price-
fixers should go to prison, the Chief Executive Officer and Vice President of Odfjell
voluntarily travelled to the US in order to serve four month and three month prison
sentences, respectively. The Chief Executive, Sjaastad, was also sentenced to pay a
250,000 US Dollar fine. Additionally, a large number of private antitrust lawsuits were
filed against the cartel (Bloomberg, 2003).
Due to the positive experiences with the US Corporate Leniency Program, the
EU implemented its Model Leniency Program in 1996 (which was revised in 2012).
After 10 years of the EU leniency program, 24 of the 27 EU members and over 50
countries worldwide had implemented their own national programs. In Spain, cartel
members literally lined up at the day of implementation, in order to be the first to
apply for leniency. In Germany, 122 leniency applications were filed in a five year
period (Harrington and Chang, 2014). Approximately 70 % of all EU cartel cases are
results of leniency applications (Stolt-Nielsen, 2011). The EU program is similar to that
of the US in the sense that only the first firm to apply for leniency can be granted full
leniency (i.e. that all penalties are waived). However, in the EU several other firms may
also receive reductions in fines by cooperating with the authorities and revealing all
evidence. The European Commission can issue fines of up to 10 % of a firm’s turnover
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(European Competition Network, 2012).
In 2010, 11 cargo-carriers were convicted for price-fixing by the European
Commission. The airlines were fined a total of almost 800 million Euros, after
reductions in penalties. Lufthansa received full leniency, being the first of the airlines
to contact the European Commission with information. However, all of the other firms
received reductions, in a range between 10-50 % of the original fines. The Norwegian
company SAS was sentenced to pay penalties of over 70 million Euros after a 15 %
reduction. Additionally, private actors suffering damages from the cartel activity were
able to raise their own lawsuits against all 11 airlines (European Commission, 2010).
As recent as 2014, the German logistics company Schenker filed a lawsuit against the
11 airlines, demanding restitution (Dagens Næringsliv, 2014).
The Norwegian leniency program was implemented much later, namely in 2004,
as an effort to coordinate antitrust policies in the EU/EEA.1 The results, however,
were left wanting. Within the first four years of the program, only two leniency
applications were submitted. Neither of these resulted in further processing. As
opposed to the US Corporate Leniency Program, the Norwegian leniency program
only applies to corporate fines and not to criminal prosecution. Therefore, leniency
applicants still risk large criminal fines and up to three years imprisonment if found
guilty. In 2008 the Norwegian CA (Konkurransetilsynet) and The National Authority
for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim)
released a policy memo. It stated that Økokrim would not launch investigations
on violations of the competition law (Konkurranseloven) unless Konkurransetilsynet
first had pressed charges. In following years after the joint statement, the number
of leniency applications has been rising. Despite the slow start, trust in the leniency
program seems to be rising and more applications are consequently being submitted
(Stolt-Nielsen, 2011). The discovery of the previously mentioned asphalt cartel was
also a result of this leniency program.
1The EEA (European Economic Area) includes all EU countries, as well as Iceland, Norway and
Liechtenstein. It allows these countries to have access to the EU’s single market. The countries have
coordinated their legislation in a number of areas, such as labor migration, trade and competition
(GOV.UK, 2014).
3
1.2 Theoretical Background
How firms interact in an industry and make strategic choices is the focus of Industrial
Organization. In the so-called ""bible" of Industrial Organization" (Ludwig Maximilian
University of Munich, 2014), the author and recent Nobel laureate in Economics, Jean
Tirole, devotes one chapter to the topic of collusion. The book was published in 1988,
a decade after the implementation of the US’ first leniency program.
Collusion models are generally game theoretical models of repeated games. Each
period, firms in an industry meet and simultaneously set prices.2 In each period,
the competitive equilibrium leads to low pay-offs, as each firm has an incentive to
undercut its competitors’ prices. However, as the firms are meeting repeatedly in
the same market, it is possible for them to coordinate their actions and charge higher
prices. If a firm now undercuts, it will receive a one-time large pay-off, but will be
punished as cooperation breaks down (and the industry reverts to the competitive
equilibrium with low pay-offs). Whether firms are able to maintain collusion then
depends on the sizes of profits (in all contingencies: collusion, competition and
deviation), the number of firms in the industry and the firms’ patience (Tirole, 1988).3
There are a number of extensions to the simple collusion set-up. There are several
different punishment strategies which can be implemented, other than the so-called
grim-trigger strategy described in the previous section. It is for example possible for
collusion to be reinstated after a predetermined number of punishment-periods (in
the grim-trigger strategy, these punishment-periods last forever). For collusion to be
feasible, it is still needed that firms are not tempted to deviate. Additionally, they
must now be willing to punish other deviators.4 Furthermore, profits are not constant
in reality, and may be affected by a number of factors (e.g. market fluctuations and
business cycles). It is therefore possible to include stochasticly determined profits in
collusion models. As a result, we can find that collusion is hardest to maintain at the
beginning of a downturn (Tirole, 1988).
Due to the covert nature of collusion, empirical research on the topic is scarce. Also
common for these models is that government policies are considered exogenous. In
2Alternatively, competition can be modelled as quantity competition, where firms choose how much
of a good to produce. The price is then determined by the consumer demand.
3As it is a repeated game, it is assumed that firms discount future time periods. The further into the
future a period is, the less they value the pay-off in that period.
4To punish a deviator, all firms will receive reduced profits during the punishment phase. The other
firms must therefore have incentives to execute a punishment, in order for it to be a credible threat.
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reality, however, there is clearly interplay between government agencies (such as a
CA) and firms. More sophisticated models are needed in order to determine optimal
public policies. In the case of collusion, we need to model the CA’s policy choices as
game theoretical strategies. To choose the optimal policies, we must also be clear on
what should be optimized. For example, should a government aim at destabilizing
cartels (in order to cause them to desist) or should they instead prevent cartels from
forming? It is not immediately clear that both goals warrant the same optimal policy.
Despite the fact that the first leniency program was introduced in 1978 in the US,
theoretical work on such programs were not produced before the beginning of the new
millennium. Motta and Polo (2003) wrote a pioneering paper on leniency, providing a
full game theoretical model on such programs (Harrington and Chang, 2014). As the
more successful revised version of the US leniency program was not launched until
1993, this paper still came 10 years after its introduction. It therefore seems that the
theoretical assessment of leniency programs is falling, decades even, behind actual
policies. With growing interest and proliferation of leniency programs, an increasingly
larger body of research has been produced on the topic. The fundamental question to be
answered is whether or not leniency programs reduce collusion. The main conclusion
seems to be that they do (Motta and Polo, 2003; Spagnolo, 2004; Aubert et al., 2006;
Harrington, 2008; Chen and Rey, 2013; Harrington and Chang, 2014).
1.3 Research questions and structure of the thesis
Economic research on the effects of leniency programs began a full decade after the
programs were implemented. Considering the high cost collusion has for consumers
and the public (European Competition Network, 2012), it is crucial that these effects
are determined. As it is impossible to measure the actual cartel rate in a country
empirically, it increases the need for comprehensive theoretical models. They would
seem to be the best tool in order to determine the effect these policies actually have.
On the one hand, firms now have an incentive to report the cartel to the CA, as they
can avoid all penalties. This can cause cartels to break down. On the other hand, the
expected punishment from part-taking in a cartel is reduced. This can make cartels
more profitable, thereby increasing cartelization. It is not obvious which effect is
stronger, and hence whether or not a leniency program reduces collusion (Harrington,
2008).
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We can assess the opposing effects of the leniency programs by constructing a game
theoretical model. As mentioned in the previous section, the general result of these
models is that leniency programs reduce collusion. In order to identify the effects at
play, I have chosen to base my analysis on a model presented by Harrington (2008).
It isolates the CA’s policy choices merely to the degree of leniency. This allows us to
clearly identify the effects at play. Furthermore, we can define optimal leniency. Namely,
we can answer the questions: Is it in fact optimal to offer a leniency program? If yes,
how large should the fraction of fines waived ideally be?
Section 2 explains the mechanics of Harrington’s model. I present which agents
are at play, what choices they can make, the timing of their choices and what their
preferences are. The main focus of the model is how a leniency program affects cartel
desistence. As Harrington (2008) argues, if collusion breaks down more frequently,
it reduces the incentive to collude ex ante. Thereby, if desistence occurs in enough
contingencies, it will lead to deterrence.
In section 3, I start by presenting the main findings of the model. The main
conclusion is that it is optimal to offer full leniency. As previously discussed, the
US and European leniency programs differ in one important aspect. In the US,
only the first firm to come forward receives leniency. However, in the EU and
Norway, subsequent firms to cooperate with the CA will also receive some degree
of leniency. I therefore enter into a discussion of which program structure is optimal
in section 3.2. All leniency programs mentioned here state conditions for granting
leniency (US Department of Justice, 2008; European Competition Network, 2012;
Konkurranseloven, 2004). In many cases, the CA has already gathered some evidence
against the cartel, but it might not be sufficient for a conviction. I therefore turn to the
important question of when a CA should accept a leniency application and when it
should reject it.
When discussing the results of the model, we must keep in mind the underlying
assumptions and simplifications. Do these assumptions drive the results? Could
optimal leniency change if the model includes more of the CA’s policy choices (such
as the magnitude of fines, investigation effort, prosecution efforts, etc.)? What would
happen if the CA is resource constrained? Would the results be different if broken-
down cartels can re-cartelize in the future? I address these questions in section 3.2.2.
As we are using theoretical models in order to assess real-life policies, it is
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important that they encompass important features of reality. Models of leniency
programs generally consist of symmetric firms. As a result, either all or none of
the firms apply for leniency. In reality, however, it is rarely the case that several
firms simultaneously rush to the CA with leniency applications. It is reasonable to
assume that firms have private information about (put differently; a perception of)
the amount of evidence that the CA has against them. It is this perception, or signal,
of the probability that they can be prosecuted that urges them to apply for leniency.
Additionally, firms worry that their co-conspirators may apply for leniency first. This
causes an incentive for pre-emption. Therefore, I ask: What drives the choice of whistle-
blowing? How can the CA use this to its advantage? In section 4, I hence present a
model for the choice of whistle-blowing, based on another model by Harrington (2013).
Finally, I summarize the main findings of my thesis in section 5 and revisit the
questions raised in this section. I also offer some final remarks.
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2 A Leniency Model
I will base my analysis on a model originally presented by Harrington (2008). The
model aims to find optimal corporate leniency programs, in terms of the conditions
and the extent of leniency granted.
The set-up of the model is based on a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma - collusion game
with grim-trigger strategies as described in Tirole (1988). Competition can be thought
of as a classical Bertrand price game. I will focus mainly on the collusive equilibrium
of the model, as I aim to investigate how a leniency program may cause collusion to
desist.
2.1 Players and their strategies
The agents in the model are the competition authority (CA) and the n firms in the
industry.
We are interested in optimal leniency, in the sense of the degree of leniency granted
by the CA. Therefore, the CA makes a policy choice of θ [0, 1] , which is the fraction
of fines F a firm pays when granted leniency. Thus, 1−θ is the fraction of fines waived
by the CA and also the degree of leniency. Let ω (0, 1] denote the probability that
the CA opens an investigation in the industry. In the event that an investigation is
launched (and no firm applies for leniency), ρ [0, 1] is the probability that the CA
successfully detects and prosecutes colluding firms. Note that ρ = 0 is equivalent to
no investigation being launched. Therefore, there will be no loss in generality by only
examining the equilibrium in the case of an investigation. We will assume thatω and ρ
are exogenously determined,5 and that ρ is randomly distributed according to a twice
differentiable cdf G : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].6 We also assume that detection and conviction are
certain when a firm applies for (and is granted) leniency and that only the first firm to
apply will be granted leniency.7
The firms independently choose whether to collude (c) or not (nc). Subsequently,
5Realistically, the CA also chooses the size of the fine F, as well as being able to influence ω and ρ
by resources invested in investigation efforts. In this analysis, I will however focus on the degree of
leniency only, as the aim is to assess the leniency program itself. The size of the fine and efforts exerted
in investigations will therefore not be a part of the evaluation here. I will however return to a short
discussion of the CA’s choices in section 3.
6Note that ρ is a probability, namely the probability of being detected. At the same time, ρ itself
is also randomly distributed over the cumulative distribution function G, and may therefore take on a
different value in each period.
7I will return to the possibility of multiple firms receiving leniency later in the thesis.
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they choose whether to apply for leniency (l) or not to apply (nl). This choice occurs
only if they in fact colluded in the previous time period. I will return to the timing of the
game in the next subsection. If all firms collude, then each firm receives a pay-off of pi c.
If a firm chooses to deviate from collusion while the other firms stick to the collusive
agreement, then the deviating firm receives a profit of pid. If none of the firms collude,
then they all receive pinc. We will assume that pid > pi c > pinc, which is in line with a
price competition collusion game.
As the firms are playing a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game with grim trigger
strategies, detection or deviation from collusion will result in the Nash equilibrium
forever, i.e. that each firm chooses nc (with pay-off pinc) forever.
2.2 Timing
In period t = 0, the CA starts by making its policy choice of θ. With probability ω,
it opens an investigation in the industry. If an investigation is opened, ρ is realized.
After observing ρ (which is common knowledge amongst the firms) in the beginning
of period t = 1, each firm chooses whether or not to collude. Period t = 2 again
starts by a new value of ρ being realized.8 After observing ρ, each firm again chooses
whether or not to collude. Subsequently, they also choose whether or not to apply for
leniency (for their actions in the previous period).9
If firms choose the stage Nash (no collusion), they will remain there forever. If
they choose to collude and are discovered and dissolved by the CA in the subsequent
period, they also revert to the stage Nash equilibrium. However, if they choose to
collude and are not discovered by the CA, the period repeats itself. Let us call this
repeated period t = t′. It always begins with a new realization of ρ, followed by the
collusion choice and the choice of a leniency application.
If ρ is low enough, firms will choose to collude. As pid > pi c, it is clear that firms
would choose to deviate (not collude) if they are planning to apply for leniency. This
is because collusion would break down, and the (previously infinitely) repeated game
now becomes finite. This then becomes the last period of the repeated game, where
deviating from collusion is the dominant strategy. Therefore, we can assume that they
8As before, ρ is realized if an investigation is opened.
9This is a simplifying assumption of the model. However, Harrington (2008) argues that it is a
plausible assumption nevertheless. Even though evidence depreciates over time, it is quite realistic
that discovery and procecution is possible in the subsequent period.
9
Figure 1: Feasible strategies, probabilities and outcomes of period t = t′
will never apply for leniency if they have chosen to collude. In figure 1, I have depicted
period t = t′ of the game.10 The realization of ρ (in the beginning of the period) and the
final pay-offs and outcomes are determined by probabilities (of getting an application
for leniency approved, or of being discovered and prosecuted). I have depicted these
probabilities in grey, as they are not to be confused with the firms’ strategies. Finally,
the firms feasible strategies are depicted in black.
In equilibrium, the probability of getting a leniency application approved is
1
n
. This
is because it is a symmetric game, and if it is rational for one firm to apply for leniency,
it is also rational for the n − 1 other firms to do so.11 If a firm applies for leniency
(for the collusive actions in the previous period), it will therefore receive a pay-off of
pinc −θF with probability 1
n
. On the other hand, it could also be the case that another
firm is granted leniency instead. This occurs with probability
n− 1
n
, and the firm must
pay the full fine. Its pay-off in that contingency is pinc − F. Thus, the expected pay-off
when applying for leniency is:
pinc − E [θF] = pinc − ( 1
n
)θF− (n− 1
n
)F = pinc − (θ+ n− 1
n
)F
10Note that this figure is not intended as an extensive representation of the game (a so-called game
tree), but simply a visualization of the timing in period t = t′.
11If at least one other firm applies for leniency, a firm can lower its expected penalty by applying for
leniency as well, rather than paying the full fine F for sure.
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2.3 Preferences and Incentive Compatibility Constraints
From figure 1 and backward induction, we can deduce that a firm will prefer to apply
for leniency if the expected penalty when applying is lower than the expected penalty
when not applying:
E [θF | l]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected penalty when applying for leniency
≤ E [F | nl]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected penalty when not applying for leniency
1
n
θF+
n− 1
n
F ≤ ρF+ (1− ρ) · 0
ρ ≥ θ
n
+
n− 1
n
ρ ≥ θ+ n− 1
n
≡ θE,
where θE denotes the expected fraction of penalties paid in equilibrium. It is clear that
θE [
1
2
, 1] .12 We must therefore have a cut-off value of θ, which indicates whether or
not firms prefer the equilibrium where they apply for leniency. The expression above
and figure 2 show that θE increases with the number of firms. As the number of firms
increases, the chance of being selected as the one firm to receive leniency diminishes.
Therefore, it becomes less attractive for firms to apply for leniency. However, few
firms applying for leniency does not necessarily imply that the existence of the leniency
program is in vain, as it still may reduce the (unobservable) frequency of collusion in
the industry.
Despite the fact that firms may prefer a situation where no one applies for leniency,
it may not be an equilibrium. A commitment issue may arise, as deviating from a non-
leniency agreement (by in fact applying for leniency when no other firm does) could
yield a higher pay-off than continuing the agreement. In that case, not applying for
leniency would no longer be sustainable as an equilibrium, despite yielding higher
expected pay-offs. It therefore becomes clear that (given θ) we must have a cut-off
value for ρ, determining whether or not firms prefer to collude. Let us denote this
cut-off value by ρ0. The realization of ρ subsequently determines whether or not firms
apply for leniency. Harrington (2008) finds that there are three possible equilibrium
strategies:
12θE =
θ+ n− 1
n
. Therefore, as we let n → 2 and n → ∞, we find that θE  [1 +θ
2
, 1]. Finally, as we
know that θ[0, 1], we must have θE[
1
2
, 1].
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Figure 2: The cut-off value θE compared to the actual θ by cartel size
1. if ρ [0,ρ0] then firms collude.13
2. if ρ  (max
{
ρ0,θ
}
, 1] then firms do not collude and apply for leniency.
3. if ρ (ρ0,θ] then firms do not collude and do not apply for leniency.
First, let us assess whether 2. and 3. are incentive compatible. We wish to determine
if the three strategies above can be equilibrium strategies. We are therefore assessing
whether there could be an incentive to deviate from them, and are not assessing the
actual equilibrium pay-offs. Note that it is not optimal to act collusively if the other
firms act competitively , therefore there is no incentive to deviate from nc.14 If other
firms apply for leniency, then prosecution is certain. Therefore, a firm will pay a lower
expected penalty by also applying for leniency (i.e. θEF) than paying F for sure. Thus,
there is no incentive to deviate from 2. If the other firms do not apply for leniency and
ρ (ρ0,θ], then the expected penalty by not applying for leniency (i.e. ρF) is lower than
paying θF for sure.15 A risk neutral firm again has no incentive to deviate from 3.
13As discussed previously, it is not rational to apply for leniency if a firm chooses to collude.
14The Nash equilibrium in this Prisoners’ Dilemma game is for all players to play nc (no collusion)
and the collusive equilibrium is for all firms to play c (collude).
15Note that we have ρ(ρ0,θ] and not ρ(ρ0,θE]. If the condition in 3. were ρ(ρ0,θE] andθ ≤ ρ ≤ θE,
then firms would have an incentive to deviate from not applying. Thus, 3. could no longer be an
equilibrium.
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It only remains to assess whether firms have an incentive to deviate from 1. Assume
that firms discount future time periods by a rate of δ [0, 1].16 Let W ≡ pi
nc
1− δ denote
the net present value of forever playing the stage Nash (with no collusion),17 and let
E[V|ρ0,θ] denote the (expected) value of continued collusion. I will return to the value
of continued collusion later in this section. For collusion to be maintained, i.e. for firms
to choose strategy c in figure 1, we get the following incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC):
Life-time value of collusion ≥ Life-time value of deviation
⇓
pi c + δ(1− ρ)E[V|ρ0,θ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of future collusion if not detected
+ δρ(W − F)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value if detected
≥ pid + δW − δ · min{ρ,θ}F︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected penalty
(1)
On the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (1), we first find the pay-off from colluding
in the present period, pi c. In the next period, there is a probability of (1− ρ) that the
cartel will be undetected, and thus continue to collude. With time-discounting, the
pay-off from continued collusion hence becomes δE[V|ρ0,θ], which is multiplied with
the probability of this contingency being realized. However, the cartel may instead
be detected and prosecuted in the following period, which occurs with probability ρ.
The cartel then reverts to the Nash equilibrium with pay-off W and has to pay the fine
F. With time-discounting and multiplying the probability of the event, this constitutes
the last part of the LHS expression.
On the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (1), we first find the pay-off when
deviating from the collusive agreement. As the firm considers breaking out of a
collusive agreement, we assume that it is the only firm to do so, hence receiving the
pay-off pid. A deviation causes the cartel to break down for sure and the firms stay
in the Nash equilibrium forever, starting from the next period. Therefore we discount
the value W for one period. If the firm applies for leniency when deviating, it will be
the only firm to do so (and a leniency application is granted for sure). A risk-neutral
firm wishes to minimize the expected fine it has to pay, therefore weighing the risk of
detection against the fine-reduction under leniency. If the risk of detection, ρ, is low, it
16In a different interpretation, δ can be considered a measure of the firms’ patience. A higher δ then
implies that firms are more patient, or equivalently that they discount the future less.
17This is because no collusion forever has a value of W = Σ∞t=0δtpinc = pinc1− δ .
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will choose not to apply for leniency. On the other hand, if the probability of detection
is high, it would rather pay the reduced fine θF for sure.18 The last part of the RHS
expression is therefore the min-function, where the deviating firm either plays strategy
2 or 3 above.
The expected value of future collusion (E[V|ρ0,θ]) depends on the cut-off value, ρ0,
for collusion to be maintained, and the CA’s policy choice of θ. Using that ρ = 0 is
equivalent to no investigation being launched, we have:19
E[V|ρ0,θ] = (1−ω)V(0,ρ0,θ) +ω
∫ 1
0
V(ρ,ρ0,θ)dG(ρ), (2)
where
V(ρ,ρ0,θ) =

pi c + δ(1− ρ)E[V|ρ0,θ] + δρ(W − F), 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ0
W −
(
n− 1 +θ
n
)
δF, max{ρ0,θ} < ρ
W − ρδF, ρ0 < ρ ≤ θ
(3)
The expected value of future collusion in (2) is an expectation over ω (the
probability of an investigation) and all possible values of ρ, as ρ is a stochastic variable.
First, we have the value of collusion when no investigation occurs, which happens
with probability (1−ω) and implies that ρ = 0. If an investigation is launched (with
probability ω), ρ can take on any value in the interval [0, 1]. As ρ is continuously
distributed by the cdf G(ρ), the expectation over ρ becomes the integral in (2) by
definition.
The three terms in (3) correspond to the three equilibrium strategies stated above,
and represent the value of each strategy. The first line is equivalent to strategy 1.,
and to the LHS of equation (1), the incentive compatibility constraint. This is the life-
time value of colluding. The second line corresponds to strategy 2., where ρ is above
the collusion threshold ρ0, as well as the fraction of fines paid under the leniency
program (θ). Therefore, firms stop colluding, receiving the value W. All firms apply
18As it is the only firm applying for leniency, the probability of having its application approved is
now 1 (compared to
1
n
before). The expected fine paid (if applying for leniency) isθF, as opposed toθEF
when all firms apply simultaneously.
19The probability that no investigation is launched is (1−ω). In the situation where no investigation
is launched, ρ = 0. This constitutes the first part of (2). ω is the probability that an investigation
is launched, and the realization of ρ is stochastically determined. To determine the expectation of
the (period-by-period) values of optimal strategies (V(ρ,ρ0,θ)), we integrate over the distribution of
ρ (namely G(ρ)).
14
for leniency, and face either the reduced fine θF if it is granted, or the full fine F. As
previously discussed, the expected fine paid then becomes θEF.20 As the fine is paid
in the subsequent period, we again discount by δ. Finally, row 3 represents strategy 3.,
where the probability of detection is too high for collusion to be incentive compatible,
but lower than the fine reduction if leniency is granted. As collusion breaks down,
firms again receive W, but this time face an expected penalty of ρF in the next period.
By rewriting the ICC in equation (1), we can find the following expression:
Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) ≡ pi c + δ(1− ρ)E[V|ρ0,θ] + δρ(W − F)− pid − δW + δ ·min{ρ,θ}F
≥ 0
(4)
This means that collusion is maintained as long as Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) ≥ 0. We can consider
Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) to be the margin between the pay-off from colluding and the pay-off from
deviating from the collusive agreement. In this sense, a larger Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) means that
collusion is more stable, as the pay-off from deviating is much smaller compared to the
collusive pay-off. On the other hand, if Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) = 0, a firm is indifferent between
colluding and deviating. Finally, if Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) < 0 collusion is not sustainable, as the
pay-off from deviation is larger than the pay-off from collusion, and collusion breaks
down. As the realization of ρ is stochastic (and changes every period), it is interesting
to examine how Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) (the margin at which the ICC holds) changes with ρ. By
differentiating Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) with respect to ρ, we find that:21
∂Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ)
∂ρ
=
 −δ{E[V|ρ0,θ]−W} ,ρ ≤ θ−δ{E[V|ρ0,θ]−W} − δF ,θ < ρ
⇓
∂Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ)
∂ρ
< 0
As this derivative is strictly negative, it means thatΦ(ρ,ρ0,θ) moves closer to zero as ρ
increases. Intuitively, this means that if the probability of being detected and convicted
increases, collusion becomes harder to maintain, as it raises expected penalties (thus
decreasing the value of collusion).
20Where θEF =
(
n− 1 +θ
n
)
F.
21This assumes that E[V|ρ0,θ] >W, which must hold at the collusive cut-off (Harrington, 2008).
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As discussed for the three equilibrium strategies, there must be a cut-off value
for ρ, denoted by ρ0, determining whether or not firms collude. Let us now assess
what properties such a cut-off value must have. For a cut-off value, ρ˜, to be incentive
compatible, it must satisfy the condition Φ(ρ˜, ρ˜,θ) ≥ 0. As Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) is decreasing in
ρ, we therefore know that Φ(ρ, ρ˜,θ) ≥ 0 ∀ρ ≤ ρ˜. Let the optimal collusive cut-off ρ be:
ρ¯(θ) ≡ max{ρ˜ : Φ(ρ˜, ρ˜,θ) ≥ 0}
⇒ ρ¯(θ) = max{ρ˜ : Φ(ρ˜, ρ˜,θ) = 0}
The optimal cut-off ρ is the maximal ρ, that still satisfies equation (4) in the event
that the realized ρ is equal to the cut-off itself (i.e. when ρ = ρ0).22 However, as
we know that
∂Φ
∂ρ
< 0, equation (4) will hold with equality in the maximum. As
Φ(1, 1,θ) =
(
pi c − pid)−δ (1−θ) F < 0,23 we also know that if a collusive equilibrium
exists, then ρ¯(θ) < 1. Harrington (2008) shows (in Theorem 1) that ifω (the probability
of an investigation) is sufficiently low and if δ (the firms’ patience) is sufficiently high,
then an optimal collusive cut-off equilibrium exists.24 This implies that, if a collusive
equilibrium exists, there is an optimal cut-off value for ρ, namely ρ¯ [0, 1]. As ρ¯ [0, 1],
it is possible for a period’s realization of ρ to be either larger or smaller than the cut-off.
Thus, even if a collusive equilibrium exists, collusion will still break down whenever
the realized value of ρ is above this cut-off.
The very first realization of ρ determines whether or not a cartel forms. However,
all subsequent realizations of ρ will determine whether or not an existing cartel breaks
down. We can therefore, as does Harrington (2008), consider ρ¯(θ) an index of cartel
stability. It then remains for the CA to choose a degree of leniency, which destabilizes
cartels as much as possible. This will be the topic of section 3.1.
22As pi c > pinc, firms will prefer to set a cut-off value ρ˜ as high as possible, as this increases the number
of contingencies (based on the realizations of ρ) in which collusion is sustainable.
23Recall that pid > pi c and that θ [0, 1].
24For the full proof of existence, I refer to Harrington (2008).
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3 Implications of the Model
As the CA has the ability to change the degree of leniency, θ, they may be able to
reduce cartel stability. As previously mentioned, the CA may also care about the
revenue they collect through fines (F), where the leniency program could reduce this
income.25 As the agency also is likely to have limited resources, weighing the number
of investigations (affecting ω) and resources spent on prosecution (thus affecting the
distribution of ρ, namely G(·)) against the loss in revenue caused by the leniency
program becomes an important issue. Perhaps even more important is how the loss in
resources caused by the leniency program (and efforts exerted in pursuing leniency-
cases) may limit investigations and prosecution in non-leniency cases. It is indeed
possible that the existence of a leniency program may cause the overall cartel-rate to
rise, by crowding out resources otherwise used for discovering and prosecuting (non-
leniency) active cartels (Harrington and Chang, 2014). I will return to the discussion of
limited CA-resources in section 3.2, also providing conditions under which a leniency
program can reduce the instances of cartels.
Given that a CA has in fact opted for a leniency program, the question remains
to what extent leniency should be granted. Assessing the optimal degree of leniency
was the aim of the model presented in section 2. In section 3.1 we therefore assess the
CA’s optimal choice of θ, treating F,ω and G(·) as exogenous. Let us for this purpose
assume that patience is sufficiently high and that the penalty fine F and the probability
of an investigation ω are sufficiently low, such that a collusive equilibrium always
exists. In other words, we now assume that there always is a possibility that collusion
is optimal (in a contingency where ρ is low enough). The question now becomes how
to destabilize it, causing it to break down.
3.1 Optimal Choice of Leniency Policy
Collusion breaks down when ρ > ρ¯(θ). Therefore, the CA should aim at minimizing
this collusion threshold through theta. Hence, we turn to finding the optimal policy
θ∗:
25On the one hand, firms applying for leniency will get reduced fines, thus lowering the revenue
collected by the CA. On the other hand, more collusion-cases may be discovered and prosecuted, as
leniency leads to self-reporting and a sure conviction. The overall effect on revenue collected through
fines is therefore ambiguous.
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θ∗  argmin {ρ¯(θ)}
Harrington (2008) points out that, despite Φ(ρ˜, ρ˜,θ) being continuous in ρ˜, it is not
necessarily the case that solutions to Φ(ρ˜, ρ˜,θ) = 0 are continuous. As cartel stability
is ρ¯(θ) = max{ρ˜ : Φ(ρ˜, ρ˜,θ) = 0}, it may also be the case that ρ¯(θ) is discontinuous.
However, we can find the optimal policy by assessing how policy changes affect the
ICC in equation (1) on the margin. Note that Φ(ρ¯(θ), ρ¯(θ),θ) is the ICC with ρ¯(θ) as
the cut-off value for collusion used by the firms. At the same time, the realized value
of ρ in that specific period is ρ¯(θ). As the actual ρ in the period is equal to the cut-off,
firms are indifferent between continuing to collude and to deviate (which would cause
collusion to break down). This then becomes the ICC on the margin, and we want to
assess if a change in θ will sway firms towards continued collusion or ceasing to do so.
Φ(ρ¯(θ), ρ¯(θ),θ) = 0 is a necessary condition for ρ¯(θ) to be the optimal cut-off for
the firms. By assessing how this condition (which defines ρ¯(θ)) changes withθ, we may
be able to assess how ρ¯(θ) is impacted by θ. Substituting for ρ¯(θ) into the expression
for Φ(ρ,ρ0,θ) in (4) we find:
Φ(ρ¯(θ), ρ¯(θ),θ) = 0 =pi c + δ(1− ρ¯(θ))E[V|ρ¯(θ),θ] + δρ¯(θ)(W − F)
− pid − δW + δ ·min{ρ¯(θ),θ}F
(5)
3.1.1 When leniency is large initially: θ < ρ¯(θ)
Recall that the fractions of fines waived is (1−θ), which can be considered the degree
of leniency. When θ is small, the fraction of fines paid is small and the fraction of fines
waived (and the degree of leniency) is large. Let us start by assessing policies such
that θ < ρ¯(θ). As long as ρ < ρ¯(θ), collusion will be sustained. However when
ρ = ρ¯(θ) a firm may consider deviating from the collusive arrangement. As θ < ρ¯(θ)
implies that θ < ρ,26 a deviator will apply for leniency. The increase in the pay-off
from deviation (caused by an increase in leniency/decrease in θ) is what Harrington
(2008) calls "The Deviator Amnesty Effect" of the leniency program. It makes collusion
harder to maintain, as more leniency raises the incentive to deviate from collusion. A
change in θ will also affect the pay-off of continued collusion. If the firm continues to
26In this case the min-expression in (5) yields: min{ρ¯(θ),θ} = θ. The expected penalty when applying
for leniency (θF) is smaller than the expected penalty from not applying (ρ¯(θ)F = ρF). Thus a firm will
apply for leniency if it deviates.
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collude, θ does not affect the current-period pay-off.27 However, we determined that
ρ¯(θ) < 1, which means that there is a strictly positive probability that ρ > ρ¯(θ) in some
future time period.28 This implies that there is also a positive probability that collusion
breaks down in the future. As we know that θ < ρ¯(θ), therefore θ < ρ when collusion
breaks down (as we will have θ < ρ¯(θ) < ρ), and all firms apply for leniency. Firms
know that they are likely to use the leniency program at some point in the future, and
increased leniency lowers their expected fine. This raises the pay-off from collusion,
and is what Harrington (2008) calls the "Cartel Amnesty Effect". To summarize, when
θ < ρ¯(θ), there is a negative "Deviator Amnesty Effect" and a positive "Cartel Amnesty
Effect" on collusion. It therefore remains to discuss which effect is the strongest.
Let Vd = pid + δW − δθF be the pay-off from deviating when θ < ρ¯(θ), as seen in
(5) and discussed in the paragraph above. A marginal decrease in θ therefore increases
the pay-off from deviating by −∂V
d
∂θ
= δF.29 This is the "Deviator Amnesty Effect",
which increases the pay-off from deviation and therefore decreases the incentive to
collude. All colluding firms will apply for leniency when collusion breaks down.
After applying for leniency, each firm has a probability
1
n
of being granted the fine
reduction. The expected pay-off in that period therefore becomes pinc − δE[F] =
pinc − δ
[
1
n
θF+
n− 1
n
F
]
.30 A marginal increase in leniency (and therefore a marginal
decrease inθ) increases this pay-off by δ
1
n
F. This is the "Cartel Amnesty Affect", which
increases the pay-off from collusion, thereby increasing the incentive to collude.
As these two effects have opposite impacts on collusion, we can now compare the
sizes of the marginal effects in order to determine the overall effect of the leniency
program. It is clear that the "Deviator Amnesty Effect" is the largest, as δF > δx+1
1
n
F,
assuming that collusion breaks down in x periods from now. This holds even if firms
are infinitely patient,31 in which case we have F >
1
n
F. We therefore find that increased
27Recall that it is irrational for firms to apply for leniency if they are colluding, as they could receive a
strictly higher pay-off by deviating. This is because pid > pi c.
28ρ [0, 1] and has a cdf G(ρ) over the interval. As ρ¯(θ) < 1, it implies that 1− G(ρ¯(θ)) > 0. For all
values ρ > ρ¯(θ), collusion breaks down and is not incentive compatible.
29I choose to assess a marginal effect from reducing θ, as this corresponds to increasing leniency.
30As collusion has broken down, they return to the stage Nash, with the period-by-period pay-off pinc.
As all firms apply for leniency, discovery of the cartel is certain. Therefore the firms have an expectation
of the fine they will pay, where they pay θF if they are granted leniency and the full fine, F, when they
are not.
31If firms are infinitely patient, they do not discount future periods, no matter how far into the future
they are. Mathematically, it means that δ = 1, and firms care equally about this period as they do any
other time period.
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leniency always decreases collusion when θ < ρ¯(θ).
Intuitively, the leniency affects deviation directly (and in the current time period).
As the deviating firm is the only one to apply for leniency, its application is granted for
sure and it enjoys the full reduction in fines. On the other hand, if a firm waits until
collusion breaks down (in some possibly distant time period), all firms simultaneously
apply for leniency. Getting a leniency application approved is no longer guaranteed,
thus (in expectations) the firm no longer receives the full fine reduction.
3.1.2 When leniency is small initially: ρ¯(θ) < θ
Now we have that min{ρ¯(θ),θ} = ρ¯(θ) in (5). Therefore, the pay-off from deviation
now becomes Vd = pid + δW − ρθF, which is unaffected by a change in θ. Leniency is
too low for firms to apply, as they would rather face the risk of being detected (which
yields a lower expected punishment). A marginal change in leniency does not affect
this choice, and therefore does not affect the pay-off from deviation. In this case, there
is no "Deviator Amnesty Effect". As previously discussed, an increase in leniency
always increases the collusive pay-off, thereby having a positive effect on the cartel-
rate. With no change in the deviation-pay-off and the "Cartel Amnesty Effect" being
the only one of the two forces at play, an increase in leniency will increase collusion.
However, there is a third effect, which becomes relevant in this situation. The
expected value of future collusion (E[V|ρ¯(θ),θ]) depends on how large the expected
fine will be.32 To calculate this expectation, recall the integral from equation (2).33 In
the previous section, it was always the case thatθ < ρwhenever collusion would break
down in the future. As all firms "automatically" would apply for collusion, a change
in θ had a straightforward effect on the expected fine, namely, the expected fine would
be lowered by a factor of
1
n
.
Now that ρ¯(θ) < θ, this is no longer the case, and there are two possible ways
in which collusion can break down.34 It may be the case that the realization of ρ in
the break-down-period is smaller than θ, as is the case for all ρ (ρ¯(θ),θ]. Collusion
would still break down, but no firm applies for leniency, thereby choosing the lowest
32Note that this is the marginal case where ρ = ρ¯(θ). However, the expected value of future collusion
is an expectation over all future contingencies, that is, an expectation over all possible values that the
realization of ρ may take.
33There, we integrated the pay-off for each equilibrium strategy over the interval of ρ where each
strategy is applicable (weighted by the cdf G(ρ)).
34Clearly, whenever collusion breaks down, we always have ρ¯(θ) < ρ, as before.
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expected fine, ρF. Finally, there is also the interval ρ (θ, 1], where collusion breaks
down and firms apply for leniency. Recall that all firms apply for leniency whenθ < ρ,
however the expected penalty paid is θEF (as opposed to θF). We already established
that θE > θ for n ≥ 2. This means that there is a jump in the expected fine at ρ = θ.
In the contingency where ρ ' θ, we are in a situation where firms stop colluding
and do not apply for leniency. If the CA now chooses to slightly lower θ to θ′ = θ− ε,
all firms strictly prefer to apply for leniency. However, due to symmetry of the game,
this now raises their expected penalty to θEF. This is what Harrington (2008) refers
to as the "Race to the Courthouse Effect", effectively raising expected fines and thus
reducing the pay-off to collusion when leniency is increased. The size of the increase
in expected fines is approximately θEF − θF =
(
n− 1
n
)
F (1−θ), using that θ′ ' θ
when ε is small.35
In figure 3, we can see the "Race to the Courthouse Effect". I have depicted the
expected penalties faced by the firms. A reduction inθ causes the discontinuity to shift
further left, thereby increasing the number of contingencies where firms face a high
penalty. The expected fine jumps from the lower "x" to the higher "x", reducing the
expected pay-off of continued collusion. At the same time, we can also see the "Cartel
Amnesty Effect", as θE(θ′) < θE(θ). The change in θ causes the expected penalties
to shift down in the contingencies where firms apply for leniency (i.e. when θ < ρ).
This can be seen by the vertical shift from θE(θ) to θE(θ′), and it increases the expected
pay-off from collusion.
As we have two opposite effects on the collusive pay-off, the question remains
whether more leniency increases or decreases collusion when ρ¯(θ) < θ. Harrington
(2008) provides us with the necessary condition on the hazard rate, for which ρ¯(θ) is
increasing in θ.36 If
G′(ρ)
1− G(ρ) >
1
(n− 1)(1− ρ)∀ρ [0, 1), then θ
∗ exists and θ∗ = 0
(Harrington 2008, p.220). Furthermore, for this condition to be satisfied, it is sufficient
that G′′(ρ) < 0 ∀ρ [0, 1] (Harrington 2008, p.230).37 G′′(ρ) describes how the density
function of ρ (the so-called pdf) changes. A decreasing density function means that
the larger the value of ρ, the less likely the observation becomes. It is noteworthy that
35This follows from
(
n− 1 +θ−ε
n
)
F − θF '
(
n− 1 +θ
n
−θ
)
F =
(
n− 1− (n− 1)θ
n
)
F =(
n− 1
n
)
F(1−θ).
36More leniency means a lower θ, and thus a lower ρ¯(θ). Therefore, more leniency would then lead to
less collusion, as a lower cut-off (ρ¯(θ)) implies less contingencies in which collusion can be maintained.
37For the full mathematical proofs of these two conditions, I refer to the appendix in Harrington (2008).
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Figure 3: The "Race to the Courthouse Effect" and the jump in expected penalties
a strictly decreasing density function is not a common distribution function. Even
distributions that are extremely left-skewed would still be increasing in the lowest
range of ρ. Harrington (2008) argues that as ρ is the probability of discovery and
successful prosecution (when no firm applies for leniency), high success-rates are
increasingly harder to accomplish. Given the covert nature of collusion, it is not
implausible that this in fact the is case. Harrington (2008) also numerically explores
whether less than full optimal leniency could be optimal.38 However, he concludes
that in all reasonable cases, full leniency is optimal or very close to optimal.
3.2 Further leniency considerations
We have now established that full leniency is optimal for the first firm to come forward.
In the following section, we will stay within the framework of the model, and assess
in which situations leniency applications should be granted. When the CA has opened
an investigation, it will collect some evidence against the cartel. However, a conviction
is not guaranteed, and inside information from a cartel member can help ensure a
successful prosecution. On the other hand, as the CA already has collected information
38He uses several specifications of G(ρ), including a symmetric triangular distribution. In the latter
case, G′′(ρ) > 0 for ρ [0, 0.5], yet θ∗ = 0 is still the unique optimum when a collusive equilibrium
exists.
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on its own, it is not evident that the inside information always would be crucial
to the case. We therefore need to find the optimal conditions for when to accept a
leniency application. This will be the discussed in 3.2.1, and we will start the section
by assessing the option of granting leniency to more than one firm.
Our model limits the CA’s choices to the degree of leniency. In 3.2.2 we therefore
attempt to look beyond the simplifications of this model, and discuss other CA policy
considerations. In reality, the CA may choose (or at least influence) the size of the fine
F, the resources spent on investigations and their prosecution efforts. Including these
choices, as well as the fact that CAs generally face resource constraints, is the main
focus of the section. It then becomes important how the leniency program impacts
overall collusion in a range of industries.
3.2.1 Conditions for granting leniency
In the model we have presented here, it is assumed that leniency is only granted if no
other firm has applied previously. It means that only the first firm to come forward
receives leniency. However, this does not correspond well with EU practice, where
also a second firm may receive some leniency (Harrington, 2008). Also in Norway,
several firms may receive leniency. Only the first firm will be granted full leniency, but
partial leniency of 30-50 % may be offered to the second firm to come forward, and
leniency of 20-30 % can be offered to all subsequent firms contributing evidence in an
investigation (Konkurranseloven, 2004).
A possibility of several firms receiving leniency can be represented in our model
by turning the penalty reduction θ into a vector, where θ = (θ1,θ2, ...,θn) and θ j [0, 1]
∀ j = 1, 2, ..., n. θ1F is the fine paid by the first firm and θ jF is the fine paid by the jth
firm to come forward. In the case where only the first firm to come forward receives
(full) leniency, we therefore have that θ = (0, 1, 1, ..., 1), which is in fact optimal.
To see this, note that the pay-off from deviating (from the collusive arrangement) is
only affected by θ1. Therefore, the "Deviator Amnesty Effect" is unaffected by θ j for
j = 2, 3, ..., n.39 All elements of the vector θ will, however, affect the collusive pay-
off in (2). Setting θ j < 1 for j = 2, 3, ..., n, i.e. granting some degree of leniency to
subsequent firms to come forward, will reduce the expected punishments and increase
the collusive pay-off. It therefore increases the "Cartel Amnesty Effect" and makes
39This is because the deviating firm would be the first to come forward, therefore receiving the penalty
θ1F. The penalties faced by other firms do not affect the pay-off from deviation.
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collusion easier to maintain. In our model, it is therefore rational to grant full leniency
to the first firm to come forward, and no leniency to all others.
The model in chapter 2 assumes that prosecution is certain (ρ = 1) when a firm
applies for (and is granted) leniency. In reality, the evidence presented by the firm may
raise ρ and be enough for the CA to secure search warrants, however prosecution is
not guaranteed. By allowing subsequent firms to receive partial leniency for further
evidence, the CA can strengthen its case and raise the probability of convicting other
cartel members. As this aspect is not incorporated in our model, we are unable to
assess the overall effect of offering leniency to more than one firm (as practiced in the
EU and Norway). It remains an open question if some degree of leniency for several
firms could be optimal. This is an area in need of further research, as simple leniency
models are unable to answer the question at hand.
In reality, it is hard to achieve certainty in prosecution. A natural question
then arises about the requirements for getting a leniency application approved. The
Norwegian Competition Law (Konkurranseloven, 2004) states that the evidence put
forward by the firm must be sufficient for the CA to either issue a search warrant or
to prove collusion. In either case, the CA itself must not have sufficient evidence at
the time of application. This is equivalent to the condition in the leniency program of
the European Competition Network (ECN), which is applicable in the jurisdiction of
the European Commission (European Competition Network, 2012). The conditions for
leniency in the US are also similar. As stated in the Department of Justice’s Corporate
Leniency Program, it is required that "the Division does not have evidence against the
company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction" (US Department of Justice,
2008, p. 5).
The question now remains: what constitutes sufficient evidence? Note that this is
a question of how much of their own evidence is enough for the CA in order to reject a
leniency application. As ρ is the probability of successful prosecution without leniency,
we can consider this a measure of the CA’s evidence against the cartel. We can therefore
find a cut-off value ρˆ chosen by the CA. If ρ < ρˆ, it implies that the CA’s case is weak
and it therefore accepts the leniency application. Conversely, if the CA already has
collected "sufficient evidence" at the time of the leniency application, i.e. when ρ > ρˆ,
the CA should not grant leniency. This implies that the CA now has two choices; the
degree of leniency (θ) and the cut-off for when to offer leniency (ρˆ). We therefore need
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to characterize the optimal choice of ρˆ, namely ρˆ∗.
Harrington (2008, Theorem 5) finds that:
ρˆ∗ = n− 1 +θ
∗
n
and that it is optimal to award leniency if and only if ρ < ρˆ. If we additionally assume
that the density function of ρ is non-increasing (as in section 3.1.2), he shows that the
equilibrium choices of the CA exist and are:
(θ∗, ρˆ∗) =
(
0,
n− 1
n
)
This tells us that the CA should always grant leniency when the probability of
conviction is below 50%.40 It also implies that the leniency program should not be too
strict when granting leniency, especially when larger numbers of firms are involved in
collusion. For example, when a cartel consists of 10 firms, it is optimal to grant leniency
as long as the probability of conviction is below 90%. This is caused by the "Race to the
Courthouse Effect", which becomes stronger as the number of firms increases.41
If there are limits to how much evidence a single firm can produce, we again return
to the question of whether it could be optimal to allow a second firm to come forward
(and possibly also subsequent firms) to receive partial leniency. It is a limitation of the
model that it is unable to assess the effects of the European leniency programs, where
more than one firm can be granted some degree of leniency. According to the model
presented here, it is not optimal to offer leniency to more than one firm. The structure
of the American leniency program would therefore seem optimal.
Furthermore, we must keep in mind that the cut-off level of evidence (ρˆ∗) is chosen
to destabilize cartels most efficiently. This does not take into account the revenue the
CA can collect though fines. Motta and Polo (2003) include a budget constraint for the
CA in their pioneering leniency model. They argue that, if there were not budgetary
constraints, it would be optimal for the CA to put more resources into investigations.
Thereby, they could increase the probability of prosecution and no leniency program
40A cartel must consist of at least two firms. If n = 2, then ρˆ∗ = 1
2
= 50%.
41Recall that the jump in expected penalties is
(
n− 1
n
)
(1−θ)F. We can find the change in the jump’s
magnitude by:
∂
∂n
[
n− 1
n
(1−θ)F
]
= (1−θ)Fn− (n− 1)
n2
= (1−θ)F 1
n2
> 0. We can therefore see that
the jump in expected penalties is strictly increasing in the number of firms.
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would be offered. They point out that a leniency program is only optimal as a second
best option, when the CA has limited resources. The welfare loss caused by the
leniency program (e.g. through lost revenues from fines) needs to be weighed against
the welfare gain from deterring collusion (or causing it to desist).
3.2.2 Resources of the Competition Authority
In reality, a CA has more choices than the degree of leniency alone. It can influence
how much resources are put into investigations and prosecution. This would then
affect ω and G(ρ) from our model in chapter 2. Furthermore, it can also choose
(or at least influence) the size of fines paid by convicted cartel members. Finally, it
has budgetary restrictions and therefore cares about how much resources it spends
during investigations and prosecutions. It must weigh the costs and effects of different
efforts against each other. The loss of resources from a leniency program (as the CA
collects less revenue through fines) must be weighed against the welfare benefits from
cartel reduction. On the other hand, the leniency program may also save resources,
as it makes prosecution shorter and easier. Motta and Polo (2003) find that overall, a
leniency program is optimal when the CA has limited resources, and that full leniency
should be granted (as does Harrington (2008)).
It is unrealistic to assume that the amount of resources spent on prosecution does
not affect investigation efforts. Furthermore, it seems unreasonable that a cartel
member applies for leniency when the cartel is well-functioning. In our model, we
incorporated this aspect in the sense that no firm applies for leniency when it colludes.
Collusion stops due to a stochastic realization of ρ, which then causes collusion to
desist. The CA was able to influence the cut-off ρ, which causes collusion to break
down. In this sense, the break-down of the cartel still occurs prior to a leniency
application. If the prosecution of leniency cases is costly, the question remains if it
could be more efficient to spend more resources on discovering functioning cartels
and less on prosecuting those which have broken down on their own.42
Harrington and Chang (2014) present a model to assess this resource trade-off.
They introduce stochastic industry profits and allow for re-cartelization. Therefore,
there no longer are grim-trigger strategies such as in the model in chapter 2. If the
realization of one period’s profit becomes too high, deviation becomes so profitable
42If the goal of a CA is to minimize the losses caused by collusion, efficiency can be considered
achieving the lowest possible cartel-rate.
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that the cartel breaks down. Cartels may also break down if the CA discovers and
successfully prosecutes the cartel members. In this way, there arises a life- and death-
cycle for cartels. The authors also allow for differences in cartel frequencies between
industries, by allowing cartel stability to vary across industries.43
In this model, the CA also has more policy choices. They can still choose θ, the
degree of leniency. Due to previous results, it is assumed throughout the model
that only the first firm receives leniency, and that there is full leniency (i.e. θ = 1).
However, the CA may also choose the size of the fine F, which now is represented
as a fraction of the profit increase.44 Finally, the CA can also affect the probability of
discovery and prosecution, denoted by σ . It is still assumed that leniency cases lead
to prosecution for sure. Therefore, σ can be considered the non-leniency efforts of
the CA (i.e. the efforts of discovering and prosecuting active cartels). σ is affected
by an exogenous probability of discovery, the fraction of firms investigated and the
probability of winning a case. The latter will be adversely affected by a large caseload,
which is the number of non-leniency cases and (to a somewhat lesser extent) the
number of leniency cases. To sum up, the main policy choices of the CA are the fine
paid by cartel members, the fraction of firms investigated and its own caseload.
The goal of the CA is to maximize welfare, which in this context is equivalent
to minimizing the overall cartel rate. The interesting aspect of this model is how a
seemingly successful leniency program actually may raise the overall cartel rate. A
leniency program may be perceived as successful if many firms apply for leniency.
However, the applicants are members of already broken-down cartels, and the large
caseload from these leniency cases may crowd out non-leniency efforts. Therefore,
less is done to discover and prosecute active cartels, and more cartels are able to
form and/or last longer. Harrington and Chang (2014) find that a leniency is counter-
productive if the leniency cases require much resources,45 and if the penalties are not
sufficiently large to deter cartel formation.
These results underpin the conditions for granting leniency. It is necessary that the
evidence presented by the leniency applicant is strong enough, in order to significantly
43This can be caused by differences in demand elasticities in the industries. The industry
heterogeneity affects the frequencies of the cartels, but not the firms’ profit streams.
44Colluding firms earn higher profits than competing firms, as established earlier. In this model, the
CA chooses a fine which is proportional to the gains from collusion. The more firms gain by colluding,
the larger the fine they face if discovered.
45In this context, it means that they require close to the same amount of resources as non-leniency
cases.
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reduce the resources spent on the case. The model also puts forth another important
consideration for leniency programs. If the penalty fines for collusion are too low, it
might be more efficient not to implement the leniency program in the first place.
As Harrington and Chang (2014) include an industry-specific parameter for cartel
stability, they are able to assess differences in the effect of the leniency program. They
find the following property: "A leniency program generally reduces the range of
markets that are able to form cartels. The effect of a leniency program on average cartel
duration is decreasing in η [the parameter for cartel stability] so that markets with less
stable cartels experience a bigger decline in average cartel duration. This differential
can be so significant that a leniency program reduces average cartel duration of
relatively unstable cartels and, at the same time, increases average cartel duration of
relatively stable cartels." (Harrington and Chang, 2014, p. 23-24).
The model makes a simplifying assumption that η only affects cartel stability, but
not the firms’ profit streams. It also assumes that the profit increase from collusion is
the same fraction in all industries.46 However, if there is a correlation between cartel
stability and the profit increase from collusion, then the cartels that are strengthened by
the leniency program are precisely those that cause the most damage. If this is indeed
the case, perhaps it is not appropriate to minimize the cartel rate in order to maximize
welfare.
Its is noteworthy that all but one of the results in Harrington and Chang (2014)
depend on the assumption that there is full leniency, which is offered only to the first
firm to come forward. The model is quite complex, and turning the degree of leniency
(θ) into a vector could make the calculations intractable. Offering partial leniency to
several subsequent firms could however be modeled as reducing the caseload of the
leniency case.47 In this sense, allowing more than one firm to receive leniency could
help ensure that the introduction of the leniency program reduces the overall cartel
rate. Conversely, allowing more firms to receive (some degree of) leniency reduces
the expected fine from colluding. As previously discussed, this raises the pay-off from
colluding, which in turn can raise the cartel rate. The effects of allowing more than one
firm to receive leniency therefore remain unclear.
This model clearly incorporates more of the policy choices a CA can make, making
46As before, this increase refers to the difference between the collusive and the competitive profit.
47In the model, a leniency case increases the caseload only by a fraction λ of a non-leniency case.
Allowing more than one firm to receive leniency could be modeled as reducing λ beyond the one-firm
leniency situation.
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it more realistic. However, I find it reasonable to assume that income generated
through fines has an impact on the CA’s resources. As mentioned in section 1.1, over
90 % of the fines from cartel cases in the US came from leniency cases (Stolt-Nielsen,
2011). Despite requiring resources, leniency programs may at the same time generate
resources for a CA. How the resources generated compare to resources spent, is not
immediately clear. Furthermore, resources are not only monetary, but also time and
efforts of the CA staff. However, we can expect that revenue generated by fines has a
dampening effect on the crowding out of resources, making it less severe than assumed
in this model.
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4 Whistle-blowing
I will base this section on a simple model of whistle-blowing in the leniency context.
The model is presented by Harrington (2013), and portrays the more realistic situation
when firms have private information. Firms receive private signals about the strength
of the CA’s case. They therefore have to make a choice based not only on their own
signal, but also on whether or not they believe that the other cartel member will apply
for leniency. The set-up of the model is not unlike auction models where bidders
have affiliated valuations (Klemperer, 1999). In order to assess the effect of private
information, a comparison will be made with the baseline case of full information.
As previously discussed, a result of leniency models is that either all or none of
the firms apply for leniency. This, however, is quite far from reality, where it is most
common that a single firm applies. A proper model of whistle-blowing therefore
allows us to better understand the choice firms make. By understanding why firms
do or do not apply for leniency, there is also the possibility to influence these choices.
In this section, I first present the structure of the model and then turn to a discussion
of its results.
4.1 Structure of the model
As previously, we assume that firms only apply for leniency when collusion has
broken down.48 In this model, there are two firms, whose only choice is whether
or not to apply for leniency. Each firm receives a private signal about ρ [0, 1), the
probability that they will be discovered and convicted. Let si [s,s¯] denote the signal
that is received by firm i. Conditional on its own signal, firm i assigns probabilities
to all possible values of the other firm’s signal. Let us denote this conditional cdf as
H(s j|si).49 We assume that the signals are informative about ρ, and that they therefore
are correlated:
A1 H(s j|si) (i 6= j) is continuously differentiable in si and s j. If s′′i > s′i, then H(·|s′′i )
weakly first-order stochastically dominates H(·|s′i). If firm i receives a high
48Recall that it is irrational to continue colluding while applying for leniency. The reason for this is
that a firm could increase its profit by deviating. Therefore, it would choose not to collude when it
applies for leniency. In that sense, collusion has already broken down when a firm applies for leniency.
49This means that H(s j|si) is the probability that the other firm’s signal is smaller than (or equal to) s j,
given that firm i has received the signal si.
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Figure 4: Time line for the model of whistle-blowing
signal, it is more likely that firm j also received a high signal (compared to if
firm i had received a low signal).
Based on the signals the firms have received, they simultaneously make a choice of
whether or not to apply for leniency. Based on signal si, firm i has the strategy φ(si),
which results in the choice of either "Apply" (A) or "Not Apply" (NA) (for leniency).
If a firm applies for leniency, it will pay a punishment θF, where θ [0, 1). The other
firm will be convicted for sure, and has to pay the full penalty F. If both firms apply
simultaneously, they have an equal chance of being granted leniency. In expectation,
they will therefore each pay a fine of
(
1 +θ
2
)
F.50 Finally, if none of the firms apply
for leniency, they will pay the full fine if discovered and no fine if not. The time line
for the model is depicted in figure 4. When making its choice, a firm does not know
the true value of ρ. It must therefore form an expectation E[ρ|si], which is based on its
signal si. We assume that:
A2 E[ρ|si] : [s,s¯]→ (0, 1) is continuously differentiable and increasing in si.
This assumption entails that the expectation of ρ (which lies between zero and one)
gets larger when the signal si is increased. As the signal is an indication of how strong
the CA’s case is, it seems intuitive that a larger signal leads to a higher expectation of
(the probability of) conviction. Note that this is the firms’ expectation of ρ when they
have private signals, as the expectation is formed only based on their own signal.
As a baseline comparison to the situation with incomplete information, we may
consider the case with public signals. The structure and timing of the game are as
50This is because the expected fine is
1
2
·θF+ 1
2
· F = 1
2
(θ+ 1)F =
(
1 +θ
2
)
F.
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described above and depicted in figure 4. The only difference is that the signals si and
s j now are common knowledge. The firms’ expectation of ρ is therefore based on both
signals, i.e. we have E[ρ|si, s j]. Their strategy in the full information case, ψ(si, s j), is
also based on the signals of both firms. We assume that:
A3 E[ρ|si, s j] : [s,s¯]→ (0, 1) is continuously differentiable, responds symmetrically to
si and s j, and is increasing in si and s j.
This is the firms’ expectation of ρ when there are public signals. The difference
compared to assumption 2 is that firms now can utilize the information about ρ from
both firms’ signals.
4.2 Equilibria of the model
We now turn to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. We will start by assessing
the baseline case of public signals, in order to compare it to the solution of the game
with incomplete information.
4.2.1 Baseline case with public signals
As with our previous model, it is optimal for firm i to apply for leniency if firm j does.51
Therefore, either both or none of the firms apply for leniency in equilibrium. If firm
j does not apply for leniency, it is optimal for firm i to do the same if and only if the
following incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) holds:
θF ≥ E[ρ|si, s j]F
θ ≥ E[ρ|si, s j]
E[ρ|si, s j]−θ ≤ 0 (6)
The ICC in (6) states that the expected punishment from not applying is smaller than
the expected punishment from applying (and receiving leniency for sure).
We therefore get the following set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game:
ψ(si, s j) =
 Apply (A) , (si, s j) /∈ ΩNot Apply (NA) , (si, s j) ∈ Ω
51By also applying, firm i will lower its expected penalty from F (for sure) to
1 +θ
2
F.
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where
E[ρ|si, s j]−θ ≤ 0 , ∀(si, s j) ∈ Ω
Ω is the set of signals that satisfy the ICC in equation (6). In words; for all combinations
of signals, where the expected probability of conviction is lower than the degree of
leniency (θ), the firms do not apply for leniency. For the remaining combinations of
signals, both firms apply.
When E[ρ|si, s j] = θ, the firms do not apply for leniency. However, with a slight
increase in one of the signals, both firms apply. As with our previous model, this
causes a jump in expected penalties; now from E[ρ|si, s j]F = θF to
(
1 +θ
2
)
F. As a
result, whenever θ < E[ρ|si, s j] <
(
1 +θ
2
)
, both firms apply for leniency. At the same
time, they have higher expected penalties than they would if they did not apply. 52
4.2.2 The case of incomplete information
In the situation with incomplete information, a firm bases its decision solely on its
own signal. We must therefore find a cut-off value, x, for the signal. When the signal is
larger than the cut-off, the probability of conviction is likely to be high. Therefore, the
firm applies for leniency. If the signal is below the cut-off, the firm does not apply. We
can express the firms’ symmetric strategy as:
φ(si) =
 Apply (A) , si ∈ (x, s¯]Not Apply (NA) , si ∈ [s, x]
Incentive compatibility
We can now find the set of x for whichφ(si) constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.53
As in 4.2.1, we need to assess the incentive compatibility constraint for NA, in order to
determine the set of signals for which both firms choosing NA is an equilibrium:
Expected penalty from playing NA ≤ Expected penalty from playing A
52This is because it is not incentive compatible for them to choose NA, as each of them has an incentive
to deviate. By applying for leniency, the deviating firm would get leniency for sure. AsθF < E[ρ|si , s j]F,
it could lower its expected punishment by deviating. Thus, it is not an equilibrium for the firms to choose
NA.
53Note that as there is a set of x’s, there is also a set of Bayesian Nash equilibria. Harrington (2013)
briefly discusses the Pareto ranking of the equilibria, and concludes that firms prefer the equilibrium
with the highest cut-off x.
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If firm i does not apply for leniency, one of three contingencies may occur. Firstly,
firm j may apply for leniency, and firm i has to pay the fine F. Secondly, firm j may also
choose not to apply, but the firms are discovered and prosecuted by the CA. They both
have to pay F. Finally, firm j may choose not to apply, the firms may not be discovered
and no fines are paid. We therefore get the following expected penalty from playing
NA:
[1− H(x|si)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob.that firm j applies
·F+ H(x|si) · E[ρ|si, {s j ≤ x}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exp.prob. of conviction
·F+ H(x|si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. that firm j does not apply
·0 (7)
As H(x|si) is the probability that firm j receives a signal smaller than the cut-off x, it is
also the probability that firm j does not apply for leniency. Note that this probability is
conditional on firm i’s signal. The expected probability of conviction does not only
depend on si, but it is also necessary that firm j does not apply for leniency. The
expectation is therefore also conditional on s j being under the cut-off.
If firm i applies for leniency, conviction is certain. However, it is not certain whether
or not firm j also applies. If firm i is the only one to apply, it receives leniency and must
pay θF. If both firms apply, they face an expected penalty of
(
1 +θ
2
)
F. We therefore
get the following expected penalty from playing A:
H(x|si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob.that firm j does not apply
·θF+ [1− H(x|si)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob.that firm j applies
·
(
1 +θ
2
)
F (8)
We can insert these expected penalties in the incentive compatibility constraint. If
the expression in (7) is less than or equal to that in (8), firm i does not apply for leniency.
The ICC for NA is therefore:
[1− H(x|si)]F+ H(x|si)E[ρ|si, {s j ≤ x}]F ≤ H(x|si)θF+ [1− H(x|si)]
(
1 +θ
2
)
F (9)
Conversely, if the expression in (7) is strictly larger than that in (8), firm i applies for
leniency. The ICC for A is therefore:
[1− H(x|si)]F+ H(x|si)E[ρ|si, {s j ≤ x}]F > H(x|si)θF+ [1− H(x|si)]
(
1 +θ
2
)
F
(10)
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Rewriting either of the ICCs, we can define:
∆(si, x) ≡ E[ρ|si, {s j ≤ x}]−θ+
(
1−θ
2
) [
1− H(x|si)
H(x|si)
]
Hence, if ∆(si, x) > 0, then firm i applies for leniency. If ∆(si, x) ≤ 0, then firm i does
not apply.
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Let us now find the conditions forφ(si) to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium:
1. It must be the case that firm i has no incentive to deviate (i.e. to play NA) when
si > x. We must therefore have that ∆(si, x) > 0 for all si > x. As ∆(si, x) is
strictly increasing in the firm’s signal,54 this holds if ∆(x, x) ≥ 0.
2. It must be the case that firm i has no incentive to deviate (i.e. to play A) when
si ≤ x. We must therefore have that ∆(si, x) ≤ 0 for all si ≤ x. As ∆(si, x) is
strictly increasing in the firm’s signal, this holds if ∆(x, x) ≤ 0.
As both of these conditions must hold for φ(si) to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
we must have ∆(x, x) = 0 (such that x is an equilibrium cut-off). In other words, the
ICC for not applying in (9), must hold with equality when the signal received, si, is the
cut-off value x.
To summarize, we have the following possibilities for equilibrium cut-offs:
• If ∆(x, x) = 0, then x is an equilibrium cut-off.
When firm i receives the cut-off value x as a signal (i.e. when si = x), the expected
penalty from choosing A must equal the expected penalty from choosing NA.
• x = s is an equilibrium cut-off.
It means that firms always apply for leniency, regardless of their signal.
Therefore, only condition 1 above must be satisfied, i.e. ∆(x, x) ≥ 0 or
equivalently that (10) holds. To see this, note that H(s|si) = 0. (10) then yields:
F + 0 > 0 +
(
1 +θ
2
)
F. As θ < 1, this condition always holds for x = s. As
54 ∂∆(si , x)
∂si
=
∂E[ρ|si , s j ≤ x]
∂si︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 0 by assumption 2
−0 +
(
1−θ
2
) ∂H(x|si)∂si︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 0 by assumption 1
1
(H(x|si))2
 > 0
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previously discussed, it is always optimal to apply for leniency when the other
firm does. Therefore, if one firm always applies for leniency, it is optimal for the
other firm to do the same.
• If E[ρ|s¯] ≤ θ, then x = s¯ is an equilibrium cut-off.
If the expectation of ρ when firm i receives the highest signal possible still is
smaller than θ, never applying for leniency is an equilibrium for the firms.
First note that H(s¯|si) = 1. The ICC for NA in (9) therefore yields:
0 + E[ρ|si, s j ≤ s¯]F ≤ θF+ 0⇒ E[ρ|si] ≤ θ
Given that firm j never applies for leniency, it is optimal for firm i to do the same
if (9) holds regardless of the signal firm i receives.
• Furthermore, if E[ρ|s¯] < θ (and θ < E[s¯), s¯]), then ∆(s¯, s¯) < 0. Note that,
compared to the previous point, this is now a strict inequality. As ∆(s, s) > 0,
by continuity there must therefore exist some x = s′, s′ ∈ [s, s¯] , such that
∆(s′, s′) = 0. Thus, there are at least three equilibrium cut-offs: x ∈ {s, s′, s¯}.
4.3 The role of information
Let us recall the incentive compatibility constraint for not applying when firms have
public signals in (6). Assuming that firm j does not apply, firm i prefers to apply if and
only if:
E[ρ|si, s j]−θ > 0 (11)
In the case of private signals, we can find the equivalent condition by rewriting the
ICC for A in (10):
E[ρ|si, {s j ≤ x}]−θ > −
(
1−θ
2
) [
1− H(x|si)
H(x|si)
]
(12)
The left hand sides of the two equations can be referred to as the "Prosecution
Effects" for each of the two information cases. They are affected by the probability
of conviction when no firm applies, compared to how lenient the leniency program is.
As conviction becomes more likely (the expectation of ρ increases), the conditions in
(11) and (12) become more easily satisfied. We can interpret this as whistle blowing
becoming more attractive. Note that the LHS expressions are not the same. In (11),
the expectation of ρ is formed by observing both firms’ signals, as they are public
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knowledge. In (12), on the other hand, the other firm’s signal is unknown. The
expectation must therefore be formed conditional on one’s own signal. Additionally,
the other firm’s signal must be low enough for it not to apply for leniency.
The right hand sides of the expressions constitute what Harrington (2013) refers to
as the "Pre-emption Effect". When there is no private information, this effect is non-
existent, as seen in (11). However, when firms have private information about the
probability of conviction, they do not know for sure what their opponent will do. Their
choices of whistle blowing therefore depend on the likelihood that their opponent will
apply before them. When it is more likely that the opponent will apply for leniency,
the pre-emption effect becomes stronger.55 Therefore the incentive for whistle blowing
increases. It is noteworthy that the pre-emption effect also becomes stronger the more
lenient the leniency program is (the smallerθ is). As the fine reduction becomes bigger,
the more a firm has to gain by applying before its opponent.
However, as the LHSs of the two expressions cannot be easily compared, it is not
clear whether or not private information leads to more or less leniency applications
(and convictions). An important result of the model is that x = s is the unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium when leniency is sufficiently large (i.e. θ is sufficiently low) and
firms have private information (Harrington, 2013, Theorem 1, p.13). If a large enough
fraction of the fines is waived through the leniency program, firms always apply for
leniency (regardless of their signal). Even if E[ρ|si] < θ,56 the incentive compatibility
constraint for applying may still hold. This is because of the pre-emption effect. Even
if the prosecution effect is weak, the risk that the opponent may apply for leniency first
causes both firms to apply for sure. It is therefore not needed that there is full leniency
(i.e. θ = 0) for this equilibrium to exist and be unique.57
The existence of this unique equilibrium, however, does not explain how the private
information case compares to one with public signals. Harrington (2013, Theorem 2)
55[1− H(x|si)] is the probability that the opponent applies for leniency. As the fraction 1− H(x|si)H(x|si)
is increasing in 1− H(x|si), the LHS of (12) becomes smaller (i.e. more negative). The ICC for applying
therefore becomes easier to satisfy.
56This implies that the expected punishment from applying for leniency is actually higher than the
expected punishment from not applying. Thus, the prosecution effect alone is not strong enough to
ensure the firm’s leniency application.
57In his proof, Harrington (2013) constitutes what value of θ is "sufficiently low", such that always
applying is the unique equilibrium. For the ICC in (12) to hold, it is equivalent to state that ∆(x, x) > 0.
By setting ∆(x, x) = 0 and solving for θ, this constitutes the maximum value θ′, such that the ICC for A
holds. More precisely, if θ < θ′, then x = s is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Probability of conviction with private and public signals
shows that, if leniency is sufficiently generous,58 then leniency usage and conviction
are (weakly) higher with private signals. Moreover, if leniency at the same time is
not full (and E[ρ| s , s] < θ), then the probability of conviction is strictly higher with
private signals. This is because there will be contingencies with public signal, where
the firms choose not to apply. When signals are private, however, firms still apply in
every contingency (and the probability of conviction is equal to one).
Finally, Harrington (2013, Theorem 3) shows that, when leniency is weak, the
probability of conviction and leniency use is higher with public than with private
signals.59 To summarize, we know that the probability of conviction with private
signals is higher when θ is sufficiently low, and lower when θ is sufficiently high
compared to public signals. By assessing the two ICCs in (11) and (12), we can see
that a change in θ affects the prosecution effect equally in both equations. However, θ
additionally affects the pre-emption effect in (12). Therefore, I argue that a change
in the degree of leniency (θ) has a stronger effect on the probability of conviction
58By sufficiently generous, I mean that the condition in theorem 1 (Harrington, 2013) is satisfied.
Therefore, firms always apply for leniency when signals are private.
59Specifically, he shows that this is the case when E[ρ|s¯] < θ < E[ρ|s¯, s¯]. The condition implies that
whistle-blowing never occurs when there are private signals, as E[ρ|s¯] < θ. However, when signals are
public, there are contingencies when firms apply for leniency. This occurs when θ < E[ρ|si , s j].
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when firms have private information.60 Finally, this implies that there will typically
be a unique threshold, θˆ, such that for all θ ≤ θˆ, the probability of conviction is
(weakly) higher when firms have private signals. I have illustrated this threshold in
figure 5. We may therefore conclude that, if leniency is sufficiently large (θ < θˆ), then
the probability of conviction is higher when firms have private information. We can
also get the more realistic result that not all firms apply for leniency simultaneously,
because of private information. At the same time, the private information creates
an incentive to pre-empt the opponents application, thus raising the probability of
whistle-blowing and conviction.
As long as private actors are able to raise lawsuits against former cartel members,
it can be argued that there is no full leniency (Harrington, 2013). This is because
private claims can be very costly for firms and need to be incorporated in expected
punishments. According to the model, full leniency would lead to all firms applying
simultaneously (despite of incomplete information). The possibility of private lawsuits
can therefore be part of the explanation for why not all firms simultaneously rush to
apply for leniency. We have established that, if leniency is sufficiently large, private
information between firms leads to more leniency applications than the models in
chapters 2 and 3 suggest. Incorporating the information problem presented in this
section into leniency models seems to be a natural next step. Finally, this model
of whistle-blowing also suggests that it is in the CA’s best interest to keep firms’
information incomplete. Assuming that leniency is sufficiently generous, a CA can use
the pre-emption effect to amplify the incentive for whistle-blowing. The uncertainty
concerning the opponent’s choice will generate more leniency applications and thus
more convictions.
60By moving all terms to the LHS of (12), we can assess the effect of a change in θ on the ICC:
∂ICC
∂θ
= −1 − 1− H(x|si)
H(x|si) < −1. Even though the threshold x may change as θ increases, the
probability H will still lie between 0 and 1. As a result, the condition
∂ICC
∂θ
< −1 holds.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has discussed corporate leniency programs and their impact on collusion.
On one hand, waiving the fines of a (former) cartel member reduces the expected
punishment from colluding. This may induce more illegal behaviour. On the
other hand, the leniency program introduces an incentive to cheat on the collusive
arrangement. Thereby, it can cause cartels to break down. Additionally, if only the first
firm to apply receives amnesty, firms may "race to the courthouse" in order to apply for
leniency first. As only one firm is granted leniency, this raises the expected punishment
from collusion, making it less profitable. The main conclusion of this model (and the
main body of work on leniency programs) is that leniency programs reduce collusion.
The leniency model presented here finds that it is optimal to offer full leniency,
i.e. to waive all fines. However, this amnesty should only be offered to the first firm
to come forward. A defense could be made to offer partial leniency to subsequent
applicants, if the information presented by the first firm is not sufficient to ensure a
conviction. It is a simplifying assumption of the model that conviction is guaranteed
with only one informant. This may however be unrealistic, and there is a need to
explore the benefits and effects of granting partial leniency to additional firms. It is
also noteworthy that additional information can lead to less resources being spent
on prosecuting leniency cases. Therefore, more resources would be freed in order to
expose undetected cartels. Regardless, I cannot help but wonder whether a leniency
program where all cartel members can receive leniency (as in the SAS case in the EU)
does more damage than it does good. Removing the possibility of multiple leniency
recipients can alleviate this problem. I therefore assert that the EU and Norway ought
to grant leniency to the first firm only.
As the goal of the CA in the model presented here is to destabilize cartels most
efficiently, it also implies that amnesty should be granted even if the CA already has
a fairly strong case. The more firms are involved in a cartel, the less strict the CA
should become in accepting the application. When there are more cartel members,
the incentive to race to the courthouse becomes stronger. By allowing leniency
applications, despite already having a strong case, the CA can take advantage of this
incentive.
The model I present focuses on the optimal degree of leniency. The fraction
of fines waived is therefore modeled as the CA’s only policy choice. In reality,
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however, the CA can also influence the magnitude of fines, investigation efforts and
prosecution efforts. More importantly, CAs are generally also resource constrained.
They must therefore prioritize between prosecution and investigation efforts. If a
leniency program produces a large number of leniency applications, the prosecution
of these cases may crowd out investigation efforts. Instead of hunting active cartels,
the CA can end up spending a large share of their resources on prosecuting already
broken-down cartels. Hence, a seemingly successful leniency program may in reality
raise the overall cartel rate.61 In order to prevent this, sufficiently large penalties are
needed (Harrington and Chang, 2014). The question of whether or not to allow for
multiple leniency recipients also pertains to the resource discussion. If the information
presented by additional firms reduces the cost of prosecution, it might be beneficial to
allow more firms to receive (partial) leniency. A final point to be made in the resource
discussion is that, while leniency programs require resources, they also generate them.
If leniency cases result in a larger number of convictions, a larger amount of fines may
also be collected. This can dampen the crowding out of resources.
Models of leniency programs generally result in symmetric equilibria, where
either all or none of the firms apply for leniency. However, all members of a cartel
simultaneously racing to the courthouse rarely happens in reality. This thesis therefore
assesses a simple model of the whistle-blowing choice, where firms have private
information about the strength of the CA’s case. We find that the probability of
conviction is higher when firms have private information, given that the leniency
program is sufficiently generous. Firms still have an incentive to avoid prosecution,
but additionally want to pre-empt their opponent’s leniency application. It is therefore
desirable for CAs to maintain the information problem between firms. A natural next
step would be to incorporate private information into the general leniency model. This
would yield a more realistic model of the firms’ choices, and would better allow us to
assess the effect on cartel formation.
Given the differences in leniency policies between the US and the EU/Norway,
there clearly is a need to explicitly model the costs and benefits of allowing multiple
leniency recipients. However, if opening up for several firms to receive leniency
results in the practice of all cartel members receiving some degree of leniency, the
program can hardly be anything but counter-productive. Finally, the long-term effects
61The model used to analyze resource constraints in the leniency context, uses a life and death cycle
for the cartels. It allows for re-cartelization of industries, whenever it is incentive compatible.
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of leniency programs are rarely mentioned. Receiving leniency, while all competitors
are sentenced with large fines, could give the firm a competitive advantage. In the long
run, this could lead to other problems related to market power and forcing opponents
to exit the industry. Such long-term strategic incentives as well as their social costs
seems to be a neglected topic in the discussion of leniency models.
42
References
Aubert, C., Rey, P., Kovacic, W. E., 2006. The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing
programs on cartels. International Journal of Industrial Organization 24 (6), 1241–
1266.
Bloomberg, 2003. Odfjell’s CEO to Be Jailed, Pay Fine for Price Fixing (Update5).
Published 29.09.2003. Retrieved 29.03.2015.
URL http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQH5gAn9U.
Dc&refer=europe#share
Chen, Z., Rey, P., 2013. On the design of leniency programs. Journal of Law and
Economics 56 (4), 917–957.
Dagens Næringsliv, 2014. Krever erstatning fra SAS etter ulovlig prissamarbeid.
Published 22.08.2014. Retrieved 29.03.2015.
URL http://www.dn.no/nyheter/naringsliv/2014/08/22/1412/Luftfart/
krever-erstatning-fra-sas-etter-ulovlig-prissamarbeid
European Commission, 2010. Press Release. Antitrust: Commission fines 11 air cargo
carriers €799 million in price fixing cartel. Published 09.11.2010. Retrieved 29.03.2015.
URL http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1487_en.htm?locale=en
European Competition Network, 2012. ECN Model Leniency Programme. 2012
revision. Retrieved 17.03.2015.
URL http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mlp_revised_2012_en.pdf
Foundation for Economic Education, 1997. Breaking Up Antitrust. Published
01.01.1997. Retrieved 28.03.2015.
URL http://fee.org/freeman/detail/breaking-up-antitrust
GOV.UK, 2014. Countries in the EU and EEA. Published 12.11.2014. Retrieved
01.05.2015.
URL https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea
Harrington, J. E., 2008. Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs*. The Journal of
Industrial Economics 56 (2), 215–246.
43
Harrington, J. E., 2013. Corporate leniency programs when firms have private
information: The push of prosecution and the pull of pre-emption. The Journal of
Industrial Economics 61 (1), 1–27.
Harrington, J. E., Chang, M.-H., 2014. When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency
Program to Result in Fewer Cartels? Available at SSRN 2530545. Forthcoming in
Journal of Law and Economics.
Klemperer, P., 1999. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of economic
surveys 13 (3), 227–286.
Konkurranseloven, 2004. Lov om konkurranse mellom foretak og kontroll med
foretakssammenslutninger (konkurranseloven). Retrieved 16.03.2015.
URL https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2004-03-05-12
Konkurransetilsynet, 2014. Anker asfaltsaken. Published 20.03.2014. Retrieved
28.03.2015.
URL
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/aktuelt/nyheter/anker-asfaltsaken/
?hl=asfalt
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, 2014. Jean Tirole wins 2014 Nobel Prize in
Economics. Published 14.10.2003. Retrieved 19.02.2015.
URL http://www.en.isto.bwl.uni-muenchen.de/news/nobel_tirole/index.html
Meyer, C. B., 2011. Vennskap og kartell. Published 14.06.2011. Retrieved 29.03.2015.
URL http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/Aktuelt/Artikler-og-innlegg/
Vennskap-og-kartell/
Motta, M., Polo, M., 2003. Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution. International
journal of industrial organization 21 (3), 347–379.
NRK, 2011. Slik ble staten svindlet for millioner. Published 25.01.2014. Retrieved
28.03.2015.
URL http://www.nrk.no/norge/innrommer-prissamarbeid-pa-asfalt-1.7476170
Spagnolo, G., 2004. Divide et impera: Optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels
and organized crime.
44
Stolt-Nielsen, E., 2011. Når tale blir gull og taushet koster. Advokatbladet (3), 42–44.
Tirole, J., 1988. The theory of industrial organization. MIT press.
US Department of Justice, 2008. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust
Division’s Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters. Retrieved 16.03.2015.
URL http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.htm
45
